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Abstract
The regulation on prescribing and dispensing of antibiotics has a double
purpose: to enhance access to antibiotic treatment and to reduce the inappro-
priate use of drugs. Nevertheless, incentives to dispensing physicians may lead
to ine¢ ciencies. We sketch a theoretical model of the market for antibiotic
treatment and empirically investigate the impact of self-dispensing on the per
capita outpatient antibiotic consumption using data from small geographic ar-
eas in Switzerland. We nd evidence that a greater proportion of dispensing
practices is associated with higher levels of antibiotic use. This suggests that
health authorities have a margin to adjust economic incentives on dispensing
practices in order to reduce antibiotic misuse.
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1 Introduction
Prescribing and dispensing of drugs are main aspects of access to primary health care.
Dispensing has been physiciansresponsibility for long time. Nowadays, in developed
countries physiciansmain role is to prescribe drugs without direct dispensing. For
instance, doctors are not allowed to sell drugs directly to their patients in Germany
and the Scandinavian region. The reason is two-fold. First, the need to avoid a
conict of interest for the prescriber, and second, to optimise rationality of treatment
by ensuring good practice in dispensing (Trap and Hansen, 2003). The latter expla-
nation recalls the fact that pharmacists can often review doctorsprescriptions and
check contraindications and drug interactions.
However, direct dispensing of drugs is generally possible in some countries, likely
for the purpose of improving access to pharmaceuticals. For instance, one Scottish
region (Highland) included almost 20% of the total number of dispensing doctors
in Scotland in 2005 (Information Services Division of the National Health System
in Scotland, 2006). In Switzerland, physicians are allowed to sell drugs directly
to their patients in several cantons, with few exceptions.1 The reason may not lie
straightforwardly in the regulators objective to compensate for the lack of access
to drug treatment. Historical and cultural aspects may have contributed to shape
di¤erent rules across the country. Consequently, the low density of pharmacies in
one area may either be the reason that led the regulator to allow for self-dispensing
or the consequence of the advantage of dispensing practices in comparison to phar-
macies. Indeed, the proportion of dispensing practices among all practices is highly
heterogeneous across the country and is only slightly correlated with the degree of
urbanization.
The purpose of this article is to explore the role of practice regulation in enhancing
access to antibiotic treatment and reducing inappropriate use of antibiotics. It has
been suggested that the regulatory policy that allows physicians to sell drugs directly
to the patient may promote the overuse of drugs (Holloway, 2005; Nelson, 1987) and,
consequently, exacerbates the physican agency problem (McGuire, 2000). Physicians
may have an incentive to induce antibiotic consumption in order to increase their
1Switzerland is a federal state made of 26 cantons with remarkable di¤erences in terms of orga-
nization of the health care system and health care policy. Self-dispensing is not allowed in Geneva,
Vaud, Balle ville, Ticino and Argau. In some regions of the other cantons self-dispensing is permit-
ted.
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revenues. Filippini at al. (2009b) have recently found a positive correlation between
physicians density and the proportion of more expensive antibiotics consumed across
small areas in Switzerland. A question arises as to whether the regulator underesti-
mates the potential ine¢ ciencies induced by incentives on dispensing practices.
The literature lacks theoretical analysis of physician dispensing and empirical
investigations generally use a correlation coe¢ cient approach rather than applying
econometric models. There is evidence that prescribing costs per patient in dispens-
ing practices are higher than costs in non dispensing practices. This may be explained
by reluctancy to prescribe generics (Morton-Jones and Pringle, 1993). Moreover, dis-
pensing doctors charge higher retail prices (Abood, 1989) and have higher proba-
bility of prescribing drugs with high margin compared to non-dispensing physicians
(Rischatsch and Trottmann, 2009). Finally, they have a tendency to prescribe more
drugs per capita in comparison with non dispensing practices (Chou et al., 2003).
This seems to be particularly evident for antibacterials. Focusing on one antibiotic
substance (cotrimoxazole), Trap and Hansen (2002) examine di¤erences in the ratio-
nality of the prescription in relation to diagnosis and symptoms between dispensing
and non dispensing doctors. Dispensing doctors are found to prescribe an antibiotic
2.5 times more frequently than other doctors. As a consequence, dispensing practices
may lead to increasing health hazards and bacterial resistance.
In this article we rst propose a theoretical model of the market for community
antibiotic treatment. Under a fee-for-service remuneration scheme as in Switzerland,
doctors receive a consultation fee which varies with time allocated to the patient and
the diagnostic tests performed. Dispensing doctors may incur additional costs for
drugs in stock and gain a margin on antibiotics sold to the patient. We argue that
the interaction between imperfect information on the nature of patients infection and
economic incentives to dispensing practices may increase the likelihood of antibiotic
prescriptions, ceteris paribus. Under uncertainty on the nature of patients infection
self-dispensing physicians may increase their revenue by selling more antibiotics. To
some extent, this e¤ect may overcome the opposite e¤ect of restrictions on antibiotic
use due to di¢ culties in access to health care treatment in areas where the density
of providers is relatively poor.
Using an ad-hoc demand model we then investigate the impact of dispensing
practices on the individual outpatient antibiotic consumption empirically. Data are
drawn from small geographical areas in Switzerland. The e¤ect of dispensing practices
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is disentangled by means of econometric estimations which take into account the main
demand-side determinants of antibiotic use.
The article is organized as follows. In Section 2 we sketch the model and derive
the equilibrium levels of antibiotic use for dispensing and non dispensing practices.
Section 3 empirically investigates the impact of dispensing practices on antibiotic use
and discusses the results. Section 4 concludes.
2 A model of markets for antibiotic treatment
We develop a theoretical framework of the market for antibiotic treatment provided
by primary care physicians (GPs). We model the interaction between patients and
general practitioners when antiinfective treatment is needed as a sequential choice
in three stages. At the beginning of stage 1, nature assigns a health problem (mild
respiratory or gastro-intestinal infection), i 2 fb; vg, to each of the N individuals uni-
formly distributed along a circle line, where b is a bacterial infection and v represents
a viral infection. Consumers initially observe a symptom but cannot infer the type of
infection they su¤er from. We assume that both types of infections are equally likely.
Hence, the probability of having a bacterial infection is p = p[i = b] = p[i = v]  1=2.2
Individuals maximise their expected utility from choosing a practice. In the mar-
ket there areM general practice rms (GPj, with j 2 [1; ::;M ]), withM  2. General
practitioners can either be allowed to sell drugs directly to their patients or not ac-
cording to the legislative frame set by the health authority. Practices are located at
equal distance around the circle. All practices have equal size. Finally, whatever the
type of practices, we assume that M pharmacies are also in the market and located
nearby each practice3
Patients choice of practice depends on the perceived level of diagnosis accuracy.
Patients di¤er with respect to their location from general practitioners and to the type
of infection they su¤er from. We normalise the total market distance to 1. Hence, a
patient is located at distance dl 2 [0; 1=M ] from the nearest practice at his left and at
distance dr = 1=M   dl from the practice at his right. The di¤erentiation parameter
2The assumption of dichotomous health problems is quite common in the health economics
literature. For instance, Jelovac (2001) assumes that patients have the same probability of su¤ering
from a mildillness as well as from a severeone.
3This implies that patients do not incur additional costs of transportation to buy drugs after a
consultation with a GP. Clearly, we also hypothesize that pharmacies are not allowed to change a
doctors prescription.
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d can either be interpreted as a geographical distance between the individual and
the provider location or the distance between the individuals preferences and the
characteristics of the provider that maximises his utility.
In stage 2 the doctor makes a prescription based on a diagnosis signal. The
patient recovers naturally from viral infections after some time, by the end of stage
2 (see Figure 1). Our depicted scenario applies for instance to mild respiratory tract
infections in the community, such as colds, rhynofaringites, mild pneumonia and
otitis. We assume that some treatment with healing drugs suitable, for instance, to
reduce body temperature (antipyretic or anti-inammatory), cough (syrup) or nose
constipation (spray), decreases the cost of illness because of quicker recovery and/or
less discomfort and is always prescribed, independently of antibiotic treatment. On
the other hand, treatment with antibiotics (A) is necessary to recover from a bacterial
infection. Antibiotics do not provide any additional benet against viral infections.
Since doctors diagnosis is not always correct, a second consultation may be required
later on (stage 3) if the patient su¤ers from a bacterial infection and an antibiotic
treatment was not initially prescribed.
[Figure 1]
2.1 Information structure
The accuracy of a GPs prescription is related to the level of diagnostic services
provided. We dene pcj 2 [0; 1] as the probability of a correct diagnosis by GP j. More
diagnostic services increase the probability of a correct diagnosis through the following
simple relationship pcj(ej) = ej, where ej represents the level of diagnostic services
provided by the practice and  2 [0; 1] is a parameter. Consequently, the probability
that the diagnosis is a bacterial infection and an antibiotic is correctly prescribed
is ppcj =
1
2
ej. The probability of mistaken diagnosis will then be 12(1   ej). We
assume that doctors rely on diagnostic tests to decide upon the type of treatment
to be prescribed. Alternatively, we could assume that doctors share the results of
diagnostic tests with patients and cannot cheat on this information.
Before a consultation patients are imperfectly informed about the level of diag-
nostic services (ej) provided by the practice. They roughly assume that each value in
the range ej 2

emin; emax

is equally likely. Consequently, patients expect an average
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level of services e^j = 12e
min+ 1
2
emax  e. We normalise ej to 1= and set emin = 0 and
emax = 1=.
Patients are aware that higher intensity of diagnostic services increases the prob-
ability of a correct prescription but dont know the true level of ej. They expect a
second consultation if they do not recover by the end of stage 2.
2.2 Expected net benets of care
Switzerland is a federal state made of 26 cantons with remarkable di¤erences in terms
of organization of the health care system and health care policy. General practitioners
are paid under a pure fee-for-service scheme. This implies that total reimbursement
for a consultation depends upon the level of diagnostic services provided.4 Since
primary health care services are covered by compulsory health insurance contracts,
patients pay only a small fraction () of the total cost of care. In Switzerland this
depends upon the type of insurance plan chosen since di¤erent deductible schemes
are available.
We assume that a consultation with a doctor has a cost f (1 + ej) and does not
depend on the kind of prescription which follows. Treatment with antipyretic/anti-
inammatory drugs does not vary with the type of infection; the cost of this treatment
is set to zero. On the other hand, a course of treatment with antibiotics has a xed
cost of z (z < f).
Patients incur distance costs tdj to purchase services from provider j, where t is
the unit cost of distance. The discomfort or the cost of time for recovering, when
patients are not given an e¤ective treatment is . We summarise the costs implied by
alternative treatments conditional upon the type of infection in Table 1. To simplify
notation we dene wj = f (1 + ej).
For instance, consider a patient with a viral infection consulting doctor j. If the
GP decides to prescribe an antipyretic/anti-inammatory without an antibiotic, the
total cost of treatment includes the partial cost of a consultation (wj), plus the cost
of distance (tdj). This gives wj+ tdj in Table 1. However, if the GP makes a wrong
diagnosis, the cost of treatment will increase by z since and antibiotic will be later
prescribed. The total cost will then be  (wj + z)+ tdj.
4For instance, a consultation has a xed fee for the rst ve minutes allocated to the patient. A
diagnostic test to assess the type of infection implies an additional fee. Hence, the total fee increases
with the intensity of care provided.
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[Table 1]
2.3 Demand for GP consultations
A fully recovered patient has utility uh > 0 dened in monetary terms. Using Table
1 we can write the expected net benets from choosing practice j as
u^j = u
h   1
2
e^j (w^j + tdj)  1
2
e^j (w^j + z + tdj)
 1
2
(1  e^j) (w^j + z + tdj)  1
2
(1  e^j) (2w^j + z + 2tdj + )
= uh   1
2
[(3  e) ( w + tdj) + (2  e)z + (1  e) ] . (1)
The terms inside the brackets of equation (1) indicate the costs of treatment when
a viral infection is correctly diagnosed (rst term), a bacterial infection is correctly
diagnosed (second term), a viral infection is wrongly diagnosed and an antibiotic
is prescribed (third term), and a bacterial infection is wrongly diagnosed so that
patients need a second consultation (fourth term).
The assumption on patientsinformation implies that patients choice of practice
is based upon costly distance.5 Patients at distance dj  1=(2M) from GPl will then
prefer to consult GPl instead of GPr. Similarly, patients with distance dj > 1=(2M)
will choose GPr. By summing up the two market segments to the left-hand side and
to the right-hand side of GP j, we derive doctors initial demand for consultations as
Dj =
N
M
. (2)
The demand for consultations for GP j decreases with the number of rms in the
market. Since doctors initial demand is the same for all GPs, we drop the indexed
notation and use D instead of Dj in the following section.
2.3.1 Antibiotic treatment delay
Patients with a bacterial infection who receive a wrong diagnosis need an additional
consultation to switch to antibiotic treatment. We assume that patients disappointed
5Brekke, Nuscheler and Straume (2006, 2007) assume that a proportion of patients is uninformed
and chooses a doctor according to distance. Gravelle and Masiero (2000) assume that patients
observe practice quality with an error and then learn by experience. These models focus on capitated
systems rather than fee-for service. Our assumption is useful to simplify the model and to focus
on patients alternative strategies rather than the e¤ects of competition among providers. We then
ignore the impact of patients information structure on the choice of practice.
7
with the practice because of health complications or loss of revenue due to antibiotic
treatment delay will not leave the current practice, at least before the infection has
been cured. This hypothesis simplies the model and is perhaps quite realistic since
the nature of the infection is now fully revealed and an antibiotic will be prescribed
by the current practice.
The total demand for consultations can then be derived as
Dc = D +
1
2
(1  ej)D: (3)
Patients with a bacterial infection who need a second consultation because of wrong
diagnosis are 1
2
(1  ej)D.
2.4 Physicians objective
The general practitioner has an objective function (j) which depends upon the
benets and costs of diagnostic services provided. Using (3) we can write
j = [f (1 + ej)  c]Dc   e2j , (4)
where c is the xed marginal cost of a consultation (c < f) and  is the marginal
cost of diagnostic services.6
The level of diagnostic services is assumed to be a local public good, i.e. it does
not depend upon the number of patients diagnosed. The hypothesis suggests that
improvements in diagnosis accuracy are related to the availability of a diagnostic
technology rather than time spent with a patient.
2.4.1 Dispensing physicians
Dispensing physicians may di¤er from other practitioners for at least two reasons.
Doctors may incur some costs for keeping drugs on stock. In this sense they are more
similar to a pharmacy, than to non-dispensing practices. A shortage in the stock
implies some risks if patients cannot receive the treatment when it is needed. On the
other hand, big stocks of drugs increase the risk of getting closer to the expiry date.
Unsold drugs may imply some costs for the practice.
6Although there is a time span between di¤erent stages of the game and patients realise the
success or the failure of the initial consultation, this is a short period of time (few days) and
discounting for future prots is not applied. For similar reasons, overlapping generations of patients
are not considered, nor is the possibility of multiple infections in the cohort of patients. Our model is
maybe suitable to capture doctors behaviour under seasonal epidemic threat with annual recurrence.
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In Switzerland, dispensing physicians get a mark-up on drugs prescribed. Plau-
sibly, dispensing doctors are subject to pressure from pharmaceutical companies to
increase prescriptions to the same extent as other doctors.
We modify the objective function of the general practitioner dened by (4) to
include the expected costs and benets of self-dispensing as
dj = [f (1 + ej)  c]Dc +

Dc   D
2

(z   )  e2j ; (5)
where z is the unit price of drugs dispensed to the patient and   z represents the
unit cost of drugs on stock. The number of antibiotic treatments sold is obtained by
summing up the number of patients with a bacterial infection correctly diagnosed plus
the number of viral infections with a wrong diagnosis, and the number of patients
who requires a second consultation because a bacterial infection was not initially
diagnosed. The total amount of treatments can be summarised by Dc  D=2.
2.5 Market equilibrium
Practice rms maximise their prots in a Nash-Cournot game where the levels of
diagnostic services of the neighbouring competitors are given. Consequently, we si-
multaneously consider the set ofM objective functions j. Using (4) we derive prot
with respect to the level of diagnostic services
@j
@ej
=  2ej   [f (1 + ej)  c] 1
2
D + f

D +
1
2
(1  ej)D

: (6)
Since practice js prot depends upon the level of diagnostic services of the two
neighbouring practices, j+ and j , we solve the set of rst-order conditions @j=@ej =
@j=@ej+ = @j=@ej  = 0. Substituting for D in (6) and solving for the level of
diagnostic services we then get
Proposition 1 A Cournot-Nash equilibrium in the level of diagnostic services is
dened by
e =
3f   (f   c) 
2
 
2M
N
 + f
 : (7)
The level of diagnostic services increases with the number of infected patients
(N) and decreases with the marginal cost of e¤ort  and the e¢ ciency of services .
The number of providers, M , decreases diagnostic services since the marginal benet
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from higher treatment accuracy is reduced. This suggests that the density of general
practices may have relevant implications on the use of antibiotics. The result will be
further discussed in the following section.
2.5.1 Equilibrium with self-dispensing
Using the objective function for dispensing doctors dened by (5) and following the
procedure for prot maximisation above, we obtain
Proposition 2 A Cournot-Nash equilibrium in the level of diagnostic services with
self-dispensing is dened by
ed =
3f   [f   c+ (z   )] 
2
 
2M
N
 + f
 : (8)
Note that (z   ) increases or reduces the equilibrium level of services depending
on the relative magnitude of z and . Clearly, if antibiotic price is high enough,
then ed < e, ceteris paribus. Diagnosis accuracy is lower for dispensing practices.
However, this result may be partially o¤set by the relatively low density of practices in
areas where direct dispensing is allowed. If the cost of access to health care providers
in one area is higher because of the reduced number of practices, i.e. M is low, the
equilibrium level of services in (8) is also higher. Consequently, the negative impact
of a markup on sales (z    > 0) on the level of diagnostic services provided may be
compensated by the positive e¤ect of higher costs of access in markets with dispensing
practices. This aspect will have important implications on the per capita levels of
antibiotic use since it represents the crucial point for the comparison of prescribing
practices in di¤erent areas.
2.6 Antibiotic prescriptions
Using the equilibrium level of diagnostic services in (7) and (8), we can summarise
antibiotic prescriptions per capita. A number of patients 1
2
(e)D receive a correct
diagnosis of bacterial infection and are treated with antibiotics at the rst consulta-
tion. Misdiagnosed patients with a viral infection also receive an antibiotic at the
rst consultation. These are 1
2
(1   e)D patients. Some patients su¤ering from a
bacterial infection with a wrong diagnosis at the rst consultation will be prescribed
an antibiotic at the second visit. The number of these patients is 1
2
(1 e)D. Sum-
ming up all the patients receiving antibiotics and dividing by practice market share
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(N=M) we derive the per capita antibiotic use without and with self-dispensing as
a =

1  
2
e

, (9)
ad =

1  
2
ed

. (10)
Some interesting features can be straightforwardly derived from both (9) and (10)
through the level of diagnostic services. The marginal cost of diagnostic services (
in e) increases antibiotic use per capita, whereas the e¢ ciency of the diagnosis ( in
e) improves the diagnosis accuracy and reduces per capita antibiotic consumption.
This is because diagnostic services reduce the number of false prescriptions. For
e = emax = 1=, GPs would prescribe a = 1=2. All patients with a bacterial
infection would receive an antibiotic at the rst consultation. Conversely, none of the
patients with a viral infection would receive an antibiotic. Because of uncertainty
 < 1, which implies e < emax. Consequently, at least in some cases antibiotics will
not be correctly prescribed.
The number of practices (M in e) increases antibiotic consumption because the
level of diagnosis accuracy is reduced. Doctors have lower marginal benets from
improving diagnostic services, which in turn increases inappropriate prescriptions.
The number of infected patients, N , decreases the per capita antibiotic use. Al-
though the total number of prescription increases, the per capita antibiotic use may
decrease. We assumed that patients incur just one infection per period and that the
external benets from antibiotic use are not taken into account by doctors decisions.
The incidence of infections increases doctors demand, hence the expected benets
from increases in diagnosis accuracy (N raises e). This leads doctors to reduce inap-
propriate prescriptions per patient.
From comparison between (9) and (10) note that a < ad for e > ed, ceteris
paribus. We then postulate the following proposition
Proposition 3 Dispensing practices are likely to prescribe more antibiotics per capita
compared to other practices as far as there is a positive mark-up from selling antibi-
otics directly to the patient.
The result of Proposition 3 holds provided that the density of practices is the
same in markets where dispensing is permitted or not. As mentioned above, the
rationale behind direct dispensing of drugs is to reduce the costs of access to health
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care treatment. The regulators main objective is to allows for direct dispensing of
drugs in areas where the density of practices is relatively low compared to other
areas. This implies that the positive e¤ect of the mark-up on antibiotic sales may
not completely o¤set the impact of the higher cost of access (low density of practices)
as compared to markets where direct dispensing is not allowed. The magnitude of
these opposite e¤ects is critical aspect that we will try to disentagle by means of an
empirical approach in the following session. The hypothesis we want to test can be
summarised by the following proposition
Proposition 4 In areas where dispensing practices are allowed the individual con-
sumption of antibiotics is higher compared to other areas if the positive impact of
mark-up on antibiotic sales is not completely o¤set by the higher costs of access to
health care services.
Whether or not dispensing practices lead to higher levels of antibiotic use com-
pared to non dispensing practices clearly depends upon the strength of the incentive
related to the mark-up on antibiotic sales.
3 Empirical analysis
3.1 Econometric specication
The theoretical framework presented in section 2 (equations 7, 8, 9 and 10) suggests
that in a region dened by a circle the demand for antibiotics is inuenced by the fol-
lowing factors: physician density, the price of antibiotics, the price of a consultation,
the probability of a correct diagnosis and the incentives attached to direct dispensing
of drugs. Moreover, it is important to underline that the demand equations (9) and
(10) have been derived for a region characterised by individuals with homogeneous
socioeconomic variables such as income, age, and cultural factors.
For the empirical part of this paper we use aggregate data on the consumption
of antibiotics for 240 Swiss regions and we will adopt a representative consumer
approach, i.e. for each region we dene the dependent variable as the per capita
antibiotic consumption. Therefore, we hold the assumption that individuals are ho-
mogeneous within the region. However, the econometric specication of the demand
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for antibiotics hypothesises that some socioeconomic variables vary across the re-
gions.7
Moreover, in order to estimate one demand function rather than the two repre-
sented by (9) and (10), the empirical model includes a dummy variable representing
the di¤erence of practice styles and incentives attached to the possibility of direct
dispensing of drugs.
Building on the theoretical framework and a previous empirical study on the
determinants of small area variations in the use of outpatient antibiotics (Filippini et
al., 2009a), we specify the following model:
DIDk = f(DPHYk; DPHAk; PAk; PCk; INFk; POPlk; Yk; (11)
DBORk; DLATk; DHOSk; NOSELFk; SELFk; DTt);
where DIDk is the per capita outpatient antibiotic use in the kth market area mea-
sured in dened daily doses per 1000 inhabitants. DPHYk and DPHAk are respec-
tively the density of physicians in the area and the density of pharmacies; and PAk
and PCk are the prices of a dened daily dose of antibiotic and of a consultation,
respectively. POPlk is the percentage of the population in the l age range and INFk
is the incidence of bacterial infections (campylobacter and salmonella).8 These two
variables are proxies for the probability of a correct diagnosis. Further, the model (11)
considers some explanatory variables not explicitely dened in the theoretical models
(9) and (10). Yk is the average income in the area; DBORk, DLATk, and DHOSk
are dummy variables. The rst one captures any borderland e¤ect with neighbouring
countries. The second considers whether an area is mainly characterised by Latin cul-
ture (French- and Italian-speaking), or German culture. The third dummy accounts
for at least one hospital in the area.
Finally, since we cannot directly measure the magnitude of the mark-up on an-
tibiotic sales we use the status of practices, i.e. whether a practice can sell drugs
directly to their patients or not, as an indicator for a positive mark-up on antibiotic
7The literature on determinants of the demand for physicians services emphasises the role of so-
cioeconomic characteristics of the population and practice styles (Hunt-McCool et al., 1994; Carlsen
and Grytten 1998; Grytten and Sorensen, 2003). More closely to antibiotics, the literature suggests
that cultural aspects may inuence the use of antibiotics. For instance, Italian children receive more
courses of antibiotics than Danish children (Resi et al. 2003; Thrane et al., 2003).
8These are the leading causes of gastrointestinal infections. Since data are not available at local
level, we use information at cantonal level.
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prescriptions. Therefore, two dummy variables, NOSELFk and SELFk, are intro-
duced in the model in order to capture the impact of direct dispensing of antibiotic
use. NOSELFk takes value equal to 1 if there are no dispensing practices in the
area, 0 otherwise; SELFk takes value equal to 1 if the proportion of dispensing prac-
tices in the area is greater than 50%. The intermediate case where the proportion of
dispensing practices is greater than 0 and lower than 50% represents our benchmark.
DTt are time dummies (t = 2; 3; 4 since the rst quarter is excluded to allow for
price lags) identifying the 2002 quarters. DT4 (October, November, December) is the
baseline quarter.
From the empirical point of view, the inclusion of practice styles and incentives
attached to direct dispensing of drugs (NOSELFk and SELFk) represents the novelty
of the current approach compared to our previous study (Filippini et al., 2009a)
since practice regulation has not been considered before. Moreover, we use a log-
log functional form whereas a linear specication has been previously applied for the
purpose of measuring the welfare loss from heterogeneous attitudes towards antibiotic
use.9
We use data on the per capita antibiotic use and possible determinants in 240
small market areas in Switzerland during the four quarters of 2002. A summary of
the statistics of the variables used in this empirical analysis is provided in Table 2.
[Table 2]
The log-log specication o¤ers an appropriate functional form for investigating the
responsiveness of local per capita antibiotic sales to changes in the explanatory vari-
ables. Estimated coe¢ cients can be interpreted as elasticities. We apply the log-log
form to equation (11) assuming independently and identically normally distributed
errors (Model 1 ).
To deal with the potential endogeneity problems related to prices and the inci-
dence of infections, we consider the inclusion of lagged values. PAk is the one-period
lag for price of a dened daily dose. PCk represents the price of a standard con-
sultation with a general practitioner dened at cantonal level and captured by the
9Clearly, the model does not allow to disentagle the possible mismatch between antibiotic pre-
scriptions, antibiotic sales and antibiotic use since detailed data on these gures are not available.
We focus on determinants of antibiotic use and assume patients non-compliance to be a negligible
factor.
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point values (weights) calculated for the reimbursement of services provided by gen-
eral practitioners in 2001.10 As for the incidence of infections, we use the average
incidence of bacterial infections calculated over the years 1999-2001.
An econometric problem that could arise when estimating the demand model in
(11) is the spatial correlation due to spatial dependency in antibiotics consumption.
For this reason, we consider a second specication (Model 2 ). We estimate a spatial
two-stage least-square model (S-2SLS) which assumes that the spatially weighted
average of consumption in adjacent regions (DID k) a¤ects the consumption in each
region in addition to the standard explanatory variables. Spatial lags of exogenous
variables and cantonal dummies are used as a set of instruments to estimate the mean
antibiotic consumption in regions which are contiguous with region k.11
Our data set contains a relatively small number of time periods (t = 3), a relatively
large number of cross-sectional units (N = 240) and a zero within variation for most of
the explanatory variables. When price endogeneity is taken into account observations
for the rst quarter (t = 1) are not used. The only two variables that are changing
over time (3 quarters) are the outpatient per capita consumption and the price of
a daily dose. Consequently, the typical model for panel data, e.g. the least squares
dummy variable model and the error components model are not appropriate.12
The estimation of Model 1 is then carried out with 720 observations and by using
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) with robust standard errors.13 In the standard OLS
specication the error term is supposed to be independently and identically distrib-
uted. When the assumption is partially relaxed, the linearization/Huber/White/sand-
wich (robust) procedure allows to get estimates of the variance of the coe¢ cients that
are robust to the distribution assumptions. Instead, we use a two-stage least-square
procedure when spatial dependency is taken into account (Model 2 ). Estimations are
10In Switzerland, a detailed fee-for-service system with more than 4600 items is applied for the
reimbursement of health care providers. A given number of points is assigned to each type of service
according to time, complexity and facilities. The cantons apply di¤erent values to the basic point,
which reects the heterogeneity in the costs of services across the country. Therefore, the point
value can be interpreted as a proxy for the price of a consultation.
11For more detailed explanation see Anselin (2001) and Kelejian and Prucha (1998).
12The reliability of these estimators depends on the extent of within-regional as well as between-
regional variations of the dependent and the independent variables. As Cameron and Trivedi (2005)
point out, the xed-e¤ects approach has an important weakness in that the coe¢ cients of the
explanatory variables are very imprecise if the variables variation over time is dominated by
variation across regions (between variation).
13We also run regressions with a between estimator and with and without spatial dependency.
The results are generally conrmed.
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performed using the econometric software STATA.
3.2 Estimation results
Before focusing on the e¤ect of self-dispensing, we briey summarize the main results
from the estimation of the two models (Table 3). The adjusted R2 indicates that the
models explain approximately 75% of variations in the use of antibiotics.
The estimated spatial autoregressive parameter associated with the lag term
DID k in Model 2 is signicant and negative. This may suggest the evidence of
positive consumption externalities across the areas.14
Income elasticity varies between 0.16 and 0.22, which supports the hypothesis that
antibiotics are normal goods.15 Our result is in accordance with other ndings in the
literature (Nilson and Laurell, 2005; Henricson et al.,1998; Thrane et al., 2003).
A higher proportion of children between 0 and 14 years of age increases antibiotic
consumption in the area; conversely antibiotics are less likely to be prescribed in the
areas with a larger proportion of individuals over 74 years of age compared to the
baseline class. A negative impact is also observed for the proportion of individuals
between 60 and over 74, although the coe¢ cient is not signicant.16
[Table 3]
In both model specications the coe¢ cient of the incidence of infections exhibits
the expected positive sign but is poorly signicant. However, the estimated coe¢ -
cients of the second and the third quarters (DT2 and DT3) are both negative and
highly signicant. This is in accordance with seasonal uctuations observed by Else-
viers et al. (2007) across Europe.
14A plausible explanation for this result is related to the double role of antibiotics. Antibiotics are
used to cure bacterial infections and to prevent the spread of infections and bacterial resistance to
other individuals. Consequently, the use of antibiotics in one area minimises the spread of infections
in neighbouring areas. This implies that a smaller amount of antibiotics is required to obtain the
same level of health benets. Although patientsimperfect information may suggest that this e¤ect
is not internalised by the individual, antibiotic prescribers such as general practitioners are quite
likely to be aware of this e¤ect.
15Baye et al. (1997) nd higher income elasticity (1.33) that may be related to di¤erences in the
population under study and the type of antibiotics considered (only penicillins and tetracyclines).
16Similar results are obtained, for instance, by Mousquès et al. (2003), who investigate a panel of
general practitioners prescribing antibiotics for rhynopharingeal infections.
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Antibiotic price has a negative and signicant impact on antibiotic use in the area.
Price elasticities in Model 1 and Model 2 (-0.71) are close to the estimates of Baye
et al. (1997), who found negative compensated (-0.785) and uncompensated (-0.916)
own-price e¤ects for anti-infectives. Ellison et al. (1997) calculate price elasticities
unconditional on drug (cephalosporins) expenditure using US wholesales data from
1985 to 1991. Their estimates range between -0.38 and -4.34. The coes¢ cient on
the price of a doctor consultation is not signicant. Although expensive consulta-
tions imply higher diagnosis e¤ort, which may reduce inappropriate prescriptions of
antibiotics, this hypothesis cannot be conrmed by our results.
The physiciansdensity is positively and signicantly associated with the local per
capita antibiotic use. Estimated elasticities are around 0.11 in both specications.
Similarly, an increase in the density of pharmacies leads to higher levels of per capita
outpatient antibiotic use in the area. The estimated coe¢ cient ranges between 0.61
and 0.63.
As for the impact of self-dispensing, we nd that the proportion of practices with-
out direct dispensing of drugs (NOSELF) has a negative e¤ect on antibiotic use,
although the coe¢ cient is not signicant. Consequently, we cannot reject the hy-
pothesis that areas without dispensing practices and areas with a relatively small
proportion of self-dispensing practices (below 50%) exhibit similar levels of antibi-
otic use per capita. However, when the proportion of dispensing practices is relatively
high (more than 50%), the e¤ect on consumption is positive and signicant. The esti-
mated coe¢ cients suggest that a one percent increase in the proportion of dispensing
practices beyond 50% will increase per capita antibiotic sales by 0.32% (0.29% when
spatial dependency is taken into account).
It is worth noticing that the correlation between the rate of dispensing practices
and the density of pharmacies in the area is remarkable. This may suggest that self-
dispensing improve access to medical services. Note, however, that our estimated
coe¢ cient for dispensing practices is adjusted for the density of pharmacies and the
density of all practices. This implies that direct dispensing of drugs may increase
antibiotic consumption beyond the levels usually attained by satisfactory access to
medical services.
It can also be argued that the density of pharmacies is not a good indicator for
access to antibiotic treatment in the area. Indeed, travelling costs for the patient may
vary consistently. Consider, for instance, two small areas of the same size but di¤erent
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number of pharmacies and inhabitants. The two areas may have the same number of
providers per inhabitant but the average patients distance from the pharmacy may
be di¤erent. To address this point we run separate estimations with the density of
the population as an additional regressor. This captures the level of urbanization of
the areas and can be used as a proxy for travelling distances. The variable is never
signicant, nor it changes the results of the other covariates signicantly.
4 Conclusions
In developed countries, prescribing and dispensing of antibiotics are generally kept
separate. Switzerland, however, represents and exception. The rationale for direct
dispensing is that prescribers improve access to pharmaceuticals in areas with low
density of pharmacies. However, the regulation of self-dispensing may not be e¢ -
cient in preventing antibiotic misuse. It has been suggested that prescribing costs
per patient in dispensing practices are higher than costs in non dispensing practices
(Morton-Jones and Pringle, 1993). The separation of drug prescribing and dispens-
ing has recently proved to be e¤ective in reducing drug expenditure, for instance in
Taiwan (Chou et al., 2003).
We investigated the impact of dispensing practices on the per capita outpatient
antibiotic consumption by combining a theoretical and an empirical approach. Our
model hypothesises that the regulator who allows for direct dispensing of drugs, pre-
sumably to reduce the high costs of access to health care services, does not take eco-
nomic incentives on dispensing practices into account correctly. Dispensing practices
may reduce diagnosis accuracy of bacterial infections compared to non-dispensing
practices, thus leading to higher rates of antibiotic use per capita. The rationale be-
hind this may be three-fold: the additional costs for stocking drugs and the risk
of drugs expiring, the exposure to advertising pressure by pharmaceutical rms,
and the tendency to meet patients preferences for antibiotic treatment. Indeed,
Rischatsch and Trottmann (2009) recently suggested that dispensing physicians have
higher probability of prescribing drugs with high margin compared to non-dispensing
physicians.
Using an ad-hoc econometric model we estimated the impact of self-dispensing
on the demand for outpatient antibiotics across small areas in Switzerland after con-
trolling for access to primary care services. Our ndings support the prediction of
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the theoretical frame that dispensing practices induce higher rates of antibiotic use,
ceteris paribus. The adjustment of economic incentives attached to dispensing prac-
tices may then contribute to reduce the inappropriate use of antibiotics to contain
the threat of bacterial resistance.
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Infection Prescription Cost of di¤erent treatments strategies
v NA wj + tdj
v A wj + z + tdj
b A wj + z + tdj
b NA+A 2 (wj + tdj) + z
Table 1: The total cost of treatment depends upon doctors prescription strategy
(A=antibiotics, NA=antipyretic/anti-inammatory only) and the type of patients
infection (b=bacterial, v=viral).
Variable Description Mean Std dev.
DID Dened daily doses per 1000 inhabitants 11.714 13.061
Y Income per capita dened in CHF 23465 6849.4
POP1 Proportion of 0-14 in total population 0.1658 0.0243
POP2 Proportion of 15-25 in total population 0.1247 0.0173
POP3 Proportion of 26-59 in total population 0.4956 0.0314
POP4 Proportion of 60-74 in total population 0.1363 0.0213
POP5 Proportion of over 74 in total population 0.0776 0.0190
INF Incidence of common gastrointestinal infections 114.69 22.580
(salmonella and campylobacter) in 100000 inhabitants
DPHY Density of physicians for 100000 inhabitants 565.21 1052.5
DPHA Density of pharmacies for 100000 inhabitants 35.098 39.112
PA Price of a dened daily dose 3.7112 0.3113
PC Price of GP consultations 0.9074 0.0526
DBOR Whether or not the area borders other countries - -
DLAT Whether an area has a Latin (French and Italian) - -
or a German culture
DHOS Whether or not there is at least one hospital in the area - -
NOSELF Whether or not there are no self-dispensing practices - -
in the area
SELF Whether or not there is a majority of self-dispensing - -
practices in the area
Table 2: Variables notation and summary statistics.
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Model 1 Model 2
Equation Obs. Param. Adj. R2 F Stat. Obs. Param. Adj. R2 F Stat.
DIDk 720 17 74.79 67.77 720 18 75.06 117.39
DID k - - - - 720 51 0.8906 106.61
Covariates Coe¢ cients St. Err. p-value Coe¢ cients St. Err. p-value
Constant -1.251277 0.748058 0.095 -1.924927 0.692655 0.006
Y 0.160487 0.063923 0.012 0.218532 0.061701 0.000
POP1 0.706238 0.150325 0.000 0.663000 0.158446 0.000
POP2 -0.316837 0.124396 0.011 -0.441092 0.144956 0.002
POP4 -0.007090 0.112109 0.950 -0.125122 0.114807 0.276
POP5 -0.246217 0.066816 0.000 -0.217611 0.058438 0.000
INF 0.018684 0.020539 0.363 0.024631 0.023431 0.293
DPHY 0.115837 0.026087 0.000 0.113938 0.018334 0.000
DPHA 0.629443 0.042219 0.000 0.606146 0.028297 0.000
PA -0.715534 0.141442 0.000 -0.708980 0.136962 0.000
PC 0.023307 0.212043 0.913 -0.016681 0.210218 0.937
DBOR 0.006267 0.029780 0.833 0.016469 0.032790 0.616
DLAT -0.006311 0.042069 0.881 0.038515 0.046222 0.405
DHOSP 0.022475 0.034107 0.510 0.014798 0.029501 0.616
NOSELF -0.033033 0.032570 0.311 -0.029458 0.034179 0.389
SELF 0.316936 0.036274 0.000 0.294635 0.034244 0.000
DT2 -0.171542 0.024674 0.000 -0.204803 0.026352 0.000
DT3 -0.184313 0.023775 0.000 -0.214289 0.025391 0.000
DID k - - - -0.165151 0.049700 0.001
Table 3: Parameter estimates
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Figure 1: Doctors strategies to tackle a mild respiratory/gastro-intestinal infection.
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